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Abstract: Recent studies have shown that Grid Computing provide computational power, 
data storage and network bandwidth of under utilized resources at a minimal cost to the end 
user. It integrates geographically distributed resources and perform collaborative task. Since 
the goal of grid is resource sharing, computer resource will be accessed by a lot of users from 
different virtual organizations (YO). The security requirement becomes more vital to the 
Grids. Securities playa major role in providing the confidentiality of the communication, the 
integrity of data and the privacy of the user information. This paper focuses on to define 
current grid security issues and address grid security problem and challenges. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research and development efforts within the Grid community have produced protocol, 
services, and tools that address the challenges arising when we seek to build scalable virtual 
organization (YO) [1]. Current technologies for Grids security are still going on where the 
security is the foremost concern for the users and the stakeholder. The goal of Grid computing 
is to create a "virtual organization" across one or more physical organizations or 
"administrative domain" [2]. The most important achievement is not only secure inside the 
Grids but also need to secure outside the Grids. 
Grid computing evolution has followed the classical path; it began in academia and is slowly 
moving to the enterprise community [3]. The need of holistic and comprehensive analysis of 
existing grid security issue and available countermeasure are very important. The ongoing 
Grid security infrastructure (GSI), the portion of the Globus Toolkit, can only provide 
fundamentally secure functionalities, but cannot prevent the stealing and masquerade of user 
identity, the interception and forgery of transmission, the misuse operation of resource by 
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privileged users and illegitimate access to sensitive data or metadata by service provider or 
resource owner [4]. This paper revisits grid computing security and provides an extensive 
literature review which focuses on current grid security issues, grid security requirement and 
challenges. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents grid computing 
security overview. Section 3 describes the current status grid computing security. Section 4 
discusses the latest generation of Grids. Finally Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. GRID SECURITY 
The security of the Grid system should provide the same protection that conventional systems 
provide, including establishing the identity of users or services (authentication), protecting 
communication (encryption/decryption), determining who is allowed to perform what actions 
(authorization), and recording the important operations processed by the system (auditing) 
[4J. There are a number of basic defmitions regarding computer security. Authentication is the 
act of ensuring that someone or something is who they claim to be. Authorization is the right 
to perform some action. Integrity refers to the ability of the computer system to ensure that 
the data is protected from unauthorized modifications. Confidentiality is the ability of 
computer to keep information from being disclose to unauthorized users. Nonrepudiation 
refers to the inability of something that performed a particular action such as a fmancial 
transaction to later deny that they were indeed responsible for the event. Trust can be defined 
as the assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something 
[5]. 
From [6], a Grid security standpoint, the users, the application, or the grid middleware or 
some combination of the three must be trusted. There are four general categories of attacks on 
security services such as interruption, interception, modification and fabrication. In [5] the 
descriptions of the attacks on the security service are: i) interruption occurs when a message is 
blocked to or from a particular service. ii) Interception refers to an intruder catching but not 
necessarily blocking a message intended for a recipient. iii) Modification refers to the action 
of interpreting, modifying, and then retransmitting a message to a security service and iv) 
Fab,kation refers to generating a new message from scratch and attempting to insert it into 
! 
th~ normal message flow. 
Grid computing security can be convincing and widely use by the users such as scientists and 
engineering in any field or discipline when security is the foremost concern for management, 
implementer and developer. Such of security is difficult to find in the environment of Grids. 
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From [3] had categorizes grid security issues by classified as Host, Architecture and 
Credential Level. 
Grid security issues 
HoJ-ev-e-1-----A-r-ch-jj-e-j-re-I-ev-e-I-----c-re-d-en-L..., 
I I I I IData Job Policy Denial of Information 
protection starvation mapping service security 
I I I I I 
Resource VOlevel Confidentiatity Integrity Authentication 
level 
Figure I. Taxonomy of Grid Computing security issues. 
First, let's look at the tenn use in figure I, where Host refers to a computer system that 
includes PCs and servers. We can define a grid resource as a computing or data element 
within the grid. The main difference between a host and a resource is that a host can affiliate 
itself into the grid and become a computing resource. Finally, credentials are tickets or tokens 
used to identify, authorize and authenticate a user. 
Host level issues correspond to an on-demand grid system where the host affiliating 
itself into the grid system. The main sub issues here are data protection and job 
starvation. Architecture level issues address the concern ofthe grid system as a whole. 
Issues like infonnation security, authorization and service level security generally 
destabilize the whole systems and hence an architecture level solution is needed to 
prevent those. Credential level issues become very important in the grid context as 
there are multiple different systems which required varied credential to access them 
[7] 
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3. ISSUES IN GRID SECURITY 
According to [4] the security of the grid may affect many area of your system, from who is 
allowed to access the grid to which machines in your grid are able to perform different 
operations. Security issues in a Grid can be categorized into: 
I. System level Security: It deals with the problem of running a foreign application such 
as of viruses, worms, malicious codes etc. 
II. Architecture level Security: It deals with the development of secure infrastructure for a 
Grid system, which includes authentication, authorization and confidentiality, in Grid 
environment. 
III.  Interoperability: It deals with managing a heterogeneous security infrastructure in terms 
of different security measures like authentication, authorization etc. among multiple 
domains in an organization or larger network. 
After reviewing the security issues in Grid Computing environment, the categorization of the 
grid security issues are also nearly equal that has mention in [3]. 
a) Grid Security Requirements 
Security requirement within the Grid environment are driven by the need to support scalable, 
dynamic, distributed virtual organization (VOs) where the collection of diverse and 
distributed resources that seek to share and used the resource in a centralize coordination 
fashion. For better understanding for security requirements for grid environment, [8] give 
some example that concerns a scientific experiment called Compact Muon solenoid. In the 
experiment, conducted at the Large Hadron Collider in the CERN Laboratory, Switzerland, 
the coIlected data is to be analyzed by more than 2000 physicist at more than 150 universities 
and laboratories located in 34 countries. Ideally, the security challenges mainly come from 
dissemination, processing and sharing of the data. 
The process of dissemination of the data from one resource to another, need the authenticity 
of the requestor be verifiable so that only authorized requestor is allowed to access the 
available resources. Therefore, dealing with dissemination and access of data across many 
different countries, integration of security mechanism and policies becomes a requirement. In 
many cases, data confidentiality and integrity can be vital to safeguard the scientist research 
finding. When it comes to processing data, high end processing resources generally required 
high investment and thus it is desirable that their usage can be tightly controlled, possibly 
through access control mechanisms. This is needed in balancing the resource usage between 
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users from the physical organization and the remote user such as physicist from virtual 
organization. From data sharing aspect, trust establishment between entities of various 
universities and laboratories plays a crucial part in grid security. Policy enforcement can be 
more complicated because of the exchanging policies among the various virtual organizations 
that have differences security mechanisms and access privileges. 
With a lot of papers and journal say about the requirement of the grid security, [4, 8] has 
compile a more formal list of grid security requirement that is necessary for supporting 
scalable, dynamic and distributed virtual organization such as authentication, authorization, 
confidentiality, single sign-on, delegation, non-repudiation, accounting, auditing and 
integrity. In this paper we will cover only three of them, where it was relevant to our research. 
The first security requirement is authentication, where in grid environment there are several 
types of entities that need to be authenticated. The most common i are individual users, who 
utilize grid resources and host which provide resources and services. Secondly, is 
authorization where grid application required access to resources which may be located in 
different organization domains with different owners and thirdly, is confidentiality where as 
with other standard distributed systems, protection of sensitive information from exposure to 
unintended parties can be critical. 
b) Authentication 
Users are normally authenticated by a resource as a step that allows for establishing their 
authorization privileges, as well as for auditing and account. Authentication deals with one 
party gaining the assurance that the identity of another is declared and true, preventing 
impersonation. Entity authentication is the process of one party in the communication process 
being assured through quantitative evidence that the identity of a second party in the 
communication process is correct and allowed [9]. In [4] has mention, that there are many 
methods available for user or system authentication. Three prominent authentication models 
are public key infrastructure (PKI), Kerberos and secure shell. The detail discussion regarding 
this model will discuss below: 
1. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) - A public Key Infrastructure comprises of two keys. 
The first one is the Private Key and the other is public key. A sender encrypts his 
message with his private key and sends it to receiver. The second key is public key 
where is given to the receiver to decrypt the encrypted message by the sender. To 
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validate the keys, a reliable body is chosen who is responsible for certifying the keys 
used for communication. This body is known as Certification Authority, who in tum 
is registered with a Registration Authority (RA). This whole process of validating the 
CA by RA and further user keys by CA come under PKI. 
2. Kerberos - Kerberos [4]is a distributed authentication service that allows a process (a 
client) running on behalf of a principal (a user) to prove its identity to a verifier (an 
application server, or just server) without sending data across the network that might 
allow an attacker or the verifier to subsequently impersonate the principal. Kerberos 
optionally provides integrity and confidentiality for data sent between the client and 
server. 
3. Secure Shell - it is currently one of the most widely used secure communications 
protocol on the internet. Secure Shell [4] provides three main capabilities, which 
opens the door for many creative secure solutions: 
a. Secure command shell: it enables remote login and provides a user with a 
facility to authenticate and switch off a user in between who is trying to 
maliciously hann the system. 
b. Secure file transfer: it make the use of secure file transfer protocol to securely 
transfer the files. 
c. Port forwarding: it provides a user with the facility of data tunneling by 
securing the information passed. 
c) Authorization 
Authorization in a computer network is the permission for a user or system to access a 
particular object (computer, resource, data, or program). Authorized user should, in practice, 
be the only ones allowed to access specific data or resources [9]. In the authorization 
credential mode, [10] the user has identity credential of their own (issued by either the 
community, the resource owner, or third party) and the science gateway augments these by 
providing authorization credential that the supplied to the resource along with the user's 
identity credential. According to [5], there are two general approaches for authorization: 
identity-based or token-based. Identity-based approaches are typically associated with access 
control lists, while token-based approaches are also referred to as capability-based 
authorization. In identity-based approaches, only the authenticated user identity (and the 
requested action) is presented to the resource, which then checks an internal list of allowed 
identity/action pairs. In token-based approaches, an unforgeable token is granted to the user, 
who the presents it to the service as proof of her right. In some sense, the service does not 
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care who the presenter is, rather just that the request came with the appropriate token. A for 
drawback of identity-based approaches is that identity-based approaches cannot easily support 
delegation, in which one person allow/requests another user or software agent to act on the 
user's behalf. On the other hand, a drawback of token-based approach is that it may be very 
difficult to dynamically revoke access rights. 
In [4] has mention that, there are several methods to implement authorization such as by 
having the following methods: 
I. Access Control List (ACL) - Access control list is the mechanism that allows owners of a. User 
resources to derme manage and enforce access conditions applicable to each resource. user. 
Access control deals with the configuration of users and those actions that they should b. User 
be allowed to do. Within the database, access control involves creation of users and list 0: 
granting them the roles and privileges to do what they need to do to accomplish their c. Adm 
jobs [9]. When it comes to the Grid, this scheme is not compactable, because each newl 
virtual organization (VO) and traditional organizations will have their own policies for d. Adm 
access control. These policies and the access control based on them are high dynamic Datal 
and heterogeneous or even conflicting. And it is not reasonable to expect that 
heterogeneous systems for different purposes and under control of different parties will 
be able to define a common homogeneous set of access control and authorization 
criteria, object or a resource. 
II. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) - Role-based access control is being increasingly 
recognized as an efficient access control mechanism that facilitates security 
administration. Roles are identified with various job functions in an organization and 
users are assigned to roles based on their job responsibilities and qualification. Communica1 
Pennissions through the roles allocated for them. This feature of role-based models transport of 
greatly simplifies the management of pennissions [11]. RBAC in [4] has mention that with the risiJ 
the development of RBAC coincides with the advent ofcorporate intranet. The roles are b) Data Protec 
collections of entities and access rights grouped together based on different tasks they with approp 
perfonn in the system environment. c) Multi-level 
a. If a user moves to a new function within the organization, the user can simply must be set 
be assigned to the new role and removed from the old one any should 
b. Whereas, in the absence of an RBAC model, the user's old pennissions subsequent 
would have to be individually revoked, and new pennissions would have to d) Secure Are: 
be granted should not 
III. Community Authorization Service (CAS) - CAS [7] has been developed by the Globus affect other 
Toolkit. CAS look at the problem of scalable representation and enforcement of access 
policies within distributed virtual communities. The problem of authorization is handled 
using a trusted third party called the Community Authorization Service server which is 
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responsible for managing the policies and governing access to the community's 
resources. 
IV. Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) - VOMS is the authorization 
system developed for the European Data Grid (EDG) as part of the DataGrid and 
DataTag projects [7]. The server is essentially a front-end to an RDBMS, where all the 
infonnation about users is kept. The VOMS system is composed by the following parts 
[12]: 
a. User Server: receives requests from a client and return infonnation about the 
user. 
b. User Client: contacts the server presenting a user's certificate and obtains a 
list of group, role, and capabilities of the user. 
c. Administration Client: used by the VO administrator (adding users, creating 
new groups, roles, etc) 
d. Administration Server: accepts the requests from the clients and update the 
Database. 
d) Confidentiality 
Issues with confidentiality are more complex in that the requirements are less easily dermed. 
Most of the issues in this area are concerned with what it is acceptable for a given individual 
to see [13]. 
a) Communication - Transmissions between parties should be secured to allow the 
transport of sensitive or private data and / or programs. This becomes more important 
with the rising role ofVO's within the grid. 
b) Data Protection - In order for grids to legally exist it is essential that they comply 
with appropriate legislation, such as Data Protection Act. 
c) Multi-level services - In the case of multi-level services agreed infonnation flows 
must be set out before a service is utilized, to take into account what infonnation if 
any should be passed on of a user's identity and / or infonnation about them to 
subsequent sub services. 
d) Secure Areas - Users should have a secure area from which to run programs. Data 
should not be accessible to others from outside nor should the program be able to 
affect other processes running on a machine outside of that area. (sandbox approach) 
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From [4] we have two popular models for confidentiality. When the keys are to be passed 
between sender and receiver public key cryptography model is used and for communication 
or message passing secret key cryptography model is used. 
a) Public Key Cryptography - public key cryptography primarily focuses on solving 
issues related to key sharing and key distribution that occur in symmetric 
encryptions. The main purpose of public key cryptography is to allow distance 
users to communicate securely over an insecure channel without worrying about 
the "agreed upon" key before communication is established. Public key 
cryptography contains two related keys, the private key (to be kept secret) and the 
public key (for distribution). Public key cryptography also called asymmetric-key 
cryptography simply because not all the parties have same infonnation during the 
identity recognition and data transfonnation process. Digital signature is one of 
the applications using public key cryptography [10]. 
b) Secret Key Cryptography - It makes use of symmetric encryption [4] 
I 
i' 1. Both parties use the same key value to encrypt clear text into cipher and to 
decrypt a cipher text back into clear text. 
11. Symmetric key is how to exchange the secret key between parties who do not 
trust/know each other such as on the Internet. 
111. For a group ofn users, the number of keys to be managed is K = n (n - 1)/2 
3. CURRENCT STATUS OF GRID SECURITY 
In Grid security there is various security challenges faced such as protecting applications and 
data from system where computation executes, stronger authentication needed (for users and 
code), protect local execution from remote systems [4]. The current Grid security standard 
and popular use in the grid environment are as follow: 
3.1 Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) 
Part of the Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) function, GSI provides authentication 
and secure communication over open network connections. The GSI implementation adheres 
to the Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface (GSS-API), which is a 
standard development tool for security system promoted by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) [10]. In [4] has mention that GSI deals with interdomain operations, bridging 
the different local security solution of constituent sites. 
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• Credential, using standard X.509v3 certificates as the private keys, represents the 
identity of each entity such as user, resource, program specifying the entity's name 
and additional information, such as a public key. A certificate authority (CA) is a 
trusted third party ties an identity to a public private key pair signing a certificate. 
• An authentication algorithm, defined by the secure socket layer version 3 (SSLv3) 
protocol, checks the entity's identity. The veracity of entity's identity is only as good 
as the trust placed in the CA that issued the certificate, so the local administrator 
installs these certificates, which are then used to verify the certificate chains. 
• An entity can delegate a subset of its right-such as a process a program creates-to 
a third party by creating a temporary identity called a proxy. Proxy certificates can 
form a chain, beginning with the CA and growing, as first the user, then the user's 
proxies, signs certificates. By checking the certificate chain, process started on 
separate sites by the same user can authenticate to one another by tracking back along 
the certificate chain to fmd the original user certificate. 
• Each resource can specify its policy for determining whether to accept incoming 
requests. The initial aSI used a simple access control list, but the current version uses 
other techniques. 
• The authentication protocol verifies the global identity of involve parties, but aSI 
must convert this name to a local subject name such as a login name or Kerberos 
principal before the local security system can use the name. aSI does this by 
consulting a simple text-based map file under the local site's control thai defines the 
binding between global and local names. 
• The standard interface aSS-API provides access to security operations. aSI uses 
OpenSSL or SSLeay, the free implementation of SSLv3, for its authentication 
protocols and support for proxy certificates. SSLv3 is used widely for web security, 
has been well scrutinized for security problems, and has broad acceptance as a mature 
protocol. 
3.1 Open Grid Security Architecture (OGSA) 
The Open arid Security Architecture (OaSA) introduces both new opportunities and new 
challenges for grid security. It makes sense that OaSA security should leverage as much as 
possible the existing and emerging web services security specifications address standard 
methods for authentication and establishment of security contexts and trust relationships in 
WS-SecureCoversation and WS-Trust standard formats for security token exchange in WS-
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Security and SAML; and expression of web service security policy in WS-Policy and 
ws-sXACML [8]. These specifications have been exploited by grid developers to create unifonn 
and inter-operable methods to be used in grid security. For more details and examples of 
OGSA security and web services, see [14]. 
In [4] has mention that the OGSA roadmap proposed leverages other WS security 
specification as much as possible, when situations where other specifications are still no be 
available at the time they are needed, tactical solution are proposed that should be reconciled 
with the appropriate specification when they become available. 
ws-s 
3.3 WS-Security 
The WS-Security specification applies to all simple object access protocol (SOAP) extensions 
Vto secure message security (using different mechanisms such as XML signature and XML 
encryption) [16]. XML Signature [8] provides an XML syntax defined for digital signatures. 
An XML signature can be applied to some or all the content of one or more XML docuIJ;1ents 
or SOAP messages. 
---w 
According to [4] WS-Security also provides a general-purpose mechanism for associating 
'-----security tokens with messages. However, no specific type of security token is required by 
WS-Security. It is designed to be extensible (e.g. support multiple security token fonnats) to From Table: 
accommodate a variety of authentication and authorization mechanisms. For example, a how do we know the 
requestor might provide proof of identity and a signed claim that they have a particular 
business certification. A web service, receiving such a message could then detennine what based security compc 
kind of trust they place in the claim. 
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Table 1. WS-Security Functional Categories [16]. 
WS-Security Standard Functions 
WS-Policy Defines how to express capabilities and 
constraints of security policy 
WS-Trust Describes the model for establishing both direct 
and brokered trust relationships (include 
intermediaries) 
WS-Privacy Enables users to state privacy preferences and 
Web services to state and implement privacy 
practice. 
WS-SecureConvesation Describe how to manage and authenticate 
message exchanges between parties, including 
exchanges of security contexts, establishing and 
deriving session keys. 
WS-Federation Describe how to manage and broker the trust 
relationship in a heterogeneous federated 
environment, including the support of federated 
identities 
WS-Authorization Defines how Web Service manage authorization 
data and policies. 
From Table 1, given that there are a total six Web service specific security feature, 
how do we know their relationship to one another? To answer the question, [16] has presents 
the six WS-Security functional categories as a triangle composed of the distributed message-
based security components of trust, interoperability and integration as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Interoperability integration 
Figure 2. WS-* Security Triangle [16]. 
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3.4 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
SAML is an XML standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between 
security domains, that is, between an identity provider (a producer of assertions) and service 
provider (a consumer of assertions) [4]. SAML tries to address three scenarios - Single Sign-
On (SSO), authorization, and back office transactions. SAML uses Application Programming 
Interface (API) within Web Services to obtain trust services in order to obtain authorization 
and authentication assertions about the individuals and entities [16]. 
The main purpose of SAML is to allow trust assertions to be specified in XML and to focus 
on the authentication and authorization aspects of security. According to [16], SAML is 
fundamentally a combination of three XML-based mechanisms: 
l. Assertions - SAML is an XML schema and definition for security. 
ii. Protocol- SAML is an XML schema and definition for a request/response protocol. 
iii. Binding - SAML rules are described as sets of binding and protocols. 
3.5 Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [15] provides a policy language 
which allows administrators to define the access control requirements for the enterprise 
resources. The language and schema support include data types, functions, and combining 
logic which allow complex (or simple) rules to be defined. XACML also includes an access 
decision language used to represent the runtime request for a resource. When a policy is 
located which protects a resource, functions compare attributes in the request against 
attributes contained in the policy rules ultimately yielding a permit or deny decision. 
When a client make a resource request upon a server, the entity charged with access control 
by enforcing authorization is called the policy enforcement point. In order to enforce policy, 
this entity will fonnalize attributes describing the requester at the policy infonnation point 
and delegate the authorization decision to the policy decision point. Applicable policies are 
located in a policy store and evaluated at the policy decision point, which then returns the 
authorization decision. Using this information, the policy enforcement point can deliver the 
appropriate response to the client. 
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4. LATEST GENERATION GRIDS 
In this section we will look at some of the technologies that may have an impact on the grid 
security landscape in the future. According to [4] the current focus in Grid security is 
developing protocols that will prevent unauthorized access while enabling interoperability 
between diverse Grid sites. There are three security challenges identified by Global Grid 
Forum (GGF) for Grid environment: 
4.1 Integration 
Integration among the existing grid in the world is impossible to done, if the standard of grid 
middleware, protocol and the policy is different between each others. It is unrealistic to use a 
single security technology to address Grid security issues. Grid security architecture must be: 
i. Implementation agnostic: It can be instantiated in term of any existing security services. 
A good example is authorization. We have seen a rapid evolution in the past years of 
different authorization technologies [17] (grid-map files used by globus, VOMS, CAS, 
PERMIS) that are all non-interoperable. In addition, different deployment projects have 
hitherto adopted or supported a single version of these technologies. 
ii. Extensible: It can incorporate new security services as they become available 
iii. Integrate: Existing security services. 
4.2 Interoperability 
It is important that the security architecture used by any Grid environment allows for basic 
interoperability with other Grid deployment or middleware project such as the Open Science 
Grid [18], OMII [19], NorduGrid [20] and LCG [21]. At a minimum, it shOUld be possible to 
use the authentication and authorization architecture with system that is already in operation. 
In [4] has mention, services that traverse multiple domains and hosting environments need to 
be able to interact with each other, thus introducing the need of interoperability at multiple 
levels. The security of Grid project must be able to interoperate with the local security 
solution at different levels: 
i. At the protocol level, mechanisms that allow domains to exchange messages are 
required. 
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ii. At the policy level, each entity can specify its policy and the policy can be mutually 
comprehensive. 
iii. At the identity level, mechanisms to identify a user from one domain in another domain 
are required. 
4.3 Trust Management 
In a controlled grid environment, trust can be managed usinl stade configuration. However, 
with the growth of flexible grid system, the need for managing trust becomes more and more 
important. Trust management is the activity of collecting, encoding, analyzing and presenting 
evident relating to competence, honesty, security, or dependability with the purpose of 
making assessments and decision regarding trust relationships [4]. 
Trust management systems (TMS) responsible for managing trust in a distributed 
environment. TMS system can be divided into two main types: policy-based TMS and 
reputation-based TMS [7]. A Grid security service request can span multiple security 
domains. The security domains involved to meet a Grid service request required establishing 
trust each other. Due to the dynamic nature of a grid environment, it is unfeasible to establish 
end-to-end trust prior to execution of an application. The issues of trust establishment become 
complicated with transient Grid services [4]. 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presents the Grid Computing Security by revisit the previous and latest research in 
grid computing security. The purpose to revisit grid security is to identify areas of grid 
computing security which more extensive research is needed. More important, this paper 
contributed to the overall body of knowledge and research concerning security in Grid 
computing. Standard procedures for developing Grid applications and frameworks must 
include security as part the larger design process, particularly because the Grid presents 
unique security challenges. Therefore, our future work we will consider to looking at Identity-
Based Encryption in grid computing environment especially to achieve confidentiality which 
is a new cryptographic technique where encryption can be done using any known string 
associated with the receiver. 
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